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2 Squinting under the hot sun, one can only imagine the thoughts of Lieutenant General Hodge. He would most likely reflect on his time as an Army officer from his Regular Army commission in World
War One to taking command of the 43rd Division, which was badly demoralized during difficult combat operations in the Pacific theater. He would remember how he rebuilt that unit into an effective fighting force, which would later go on to achieve success against the Japanese. He would no doubt remember the hard fighting he personally participated in as he "island hopped"
across the Pacific, the men that had been lost under his command and his own wounds that he had received on Bouganville Island. He and others around him considered him a "soldier's soldier,"
adept at leading men in combat through his personal example and bravery. 3 He had focused his entire military career on defeating the enemy in combat. In fact, just a few years before the 1 A biography of John R. Hodge has not been written. Many of the books concerning the occupation of Korea give a brief a description of the XXIV Corps Commander; they can be found in the bibliography of this monograph. independence ceremony, he was preparing for the largest military operation of the entire war. The XXIV Corps was to take part in the invasion of the Japanese mainland in order to bring the war against the Japanese Empire to a close. Yet, in August of 1945, everything changed. Perhaps, he wondered what he did to deserve the unenviable task of occupying the Korean peninsula with limited time, guidance and resources. His thoughts returned to the staff's frantic planning in August of 1945, when the corps received orders to lead the occupation duty with just two weeks notice. The order that directed the occupation had the XXIV Corps penciled in by Supreme Allied Command planners due to the last minute changes made due to political considerations. 4 His unit began an occupation that would be remembered by few Americans enamored with the fighting in the Pacific and European theaters, but would play a critical role in setting the conditions for another major military operation on the Korean peninsula in a few short years.
If the Korean Conflict is America's "forgotten war," the occupation of Korea by US Operation BLACKLIST was the plan for the occupation of Japan under the Commander, United States Army Pacific. The occupation of Korea was a subordinate plan within the operation that was referred to as BAKER-40. For simplicity, BLACKLIST will be an all-inclusive term. population in order to hold together a fragile people struggling to find a national identity after decades of occupation and internal political strife.
The United States interest in the peninsula of Korea has a long history that would affect the approach in which it was to be governed. At the national strategic level, the United States had given implicit and explicit support to the independence of Korea through the Atlantic Charter and the Cairo Declarations. After forty years of Japanese occupation, the Korean people assumed that the arrival of U.S. Soldiers would facilitate the establishment of a free and independent Korea. The United States gave official governmental support to Korean (along with all other peoples) self-determination in August of 1941 with the issuance of the Atlantic Charter with Great Britain.
The declaration states that all peoples possess the right of self-determination, which includes choosing a representative government. 6 The Atlantic Charter was seen as the first official declaration that would allow for the Korean people to be rid of Japanese occupation. Regimes 1945 -1947 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981 . This source provides an overview of the decision to choose the 38th parallel. The decision was made in a time-constrained environment within the organization of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). While many versions of the events exist, the resultant decision and its effect are not in dispute. Within the framework of the strategic, political, social and economic situation in Korea, several obstacles existed that degraded the ability of the US to successfully achieve the objective of occupation, governance and ultimately independence of the republic of Korea. A unit, previously focused on destroying the enemy, now found itself as an occupier and builder of a nation. Beyond the obvious difficulties of such a task, Hodge had to overcome multiple impediments as the commander of the unit tasked to solve the "Korean problem." The three major obstacles facing the operational artist were the lack of planning guidance, the employment of scarce military governance assets in Korea and conflicting strategic guidance in order to achieve success on the ground.
PLANNING
In 1945, U.S. Army planning doctrine provided a framework and a methodological process for commanders and their staffs to plan and prepare both combat and routine orders. Field Manual 101-5 distilled the planning process into four distinct steps and directed staffs to follow Series 28 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 1948) . This report by the US State department provides an in depth look at the domestic political developments within Korea. The fracturing of political parties within the country only further complicated XXIV's Corps attempts control the country while setting the conditions for independence. them in a logical sequence. First, and perhaps most critical, is the commander's ability to understand the environment by making an "estimate of the situation." At the conclusion of his estimate, the commander creates a plan in order to solve the particular problem that his unit faces.
Then, he and his staff convey how to employ subordinate elements in order to execute the decided plan. Finally, the commander supervises the implementation of his plan to ensure compliance with his orders and vision. 16 In order to understand the problem that he faced, Hodge and his staff took near-heroic measures to find out what they could about the country of Korea. Primarily, there was a lack of geographic intelligence of the peninsula (in particular the landing sites), an understanding of the political situation awaiting them within the country and the status and disposition of the Japanese forces that remained on the peninsula. The processes and innovative solutions the staff used to answer these questions for the commander illustrates the adaptability of the organization and the lack of priority that was placed on Korea by higher headquarters in the Pacific.
The corps intelligence section used two sources in an attempt to solve the lack of geographical understanding of the Korean peninsula and the selection of possible amphibious landing sites. First, it was in possession of the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study of Korea, Chapter 75. This document was the corps' sole reference piece for both strategic and ground intelligence for Korea. While it did provide a general understanding of the strategic level of analysis of the peninsula, the maps were very rudimentary and required additional means to fill the intelligence gap that existed. In order to fill that gap, the corps staff resorted to aerial reconnaissance flights over the peninsula. The status and disposition of Japanese forces in Korea was also an unknown to the corps Staff. According to the order for BLACKLIST, over 270,000 Japanese troops were stationed on the peninsula. As the G-2 continued to develop its intelligence throughout August, the number was actually raised another 100,000, in addition to reports that a large Japanese Special Forces unit was present on the peninsula. The disposition of these forces was also another question as nearly all of the intelligence estimates coming from SCAP headquarters was unable to separate which Japanese units were located north of the 38th parallel and which ones would be in the corps' area of responsibility. 27 By the end of August approximately one week before the landing, the Corps G-2 (intelligence section) had a geographical breakdown of Japanese units in Korea to
give Hodge a better idea as to which specific units they would face. 28 Incredibly, Hodge did not know if they would have to fight their way onto the peninsula, or if they would be welcomed by a Japanese force complying with the recently signed surrender. BLACKLIST called for landings in strength in the event of local opposition. 29 Hodge and his staff fought the Japanese across the Pacific and most recently at Okinawa and they knew how fanatical an enemy the Japanese Soldier could be. Indeed, his fears were justified by the fact that several isolated units of Japanese
Soldiers were found decades after the war. 30 The focus on the enemy, while understandable, did not lend itself for the staff to focus on the governance and civilian problems that would prove much more difficult in the coming years.
In order to fill this human intelligence gap, the G-2 resorted to limited interrogation operations from their headquarters in Okinawa. The XXIV G-2 staff debriefed captured Korean prisoners of war that were fighting for the Japanese Army during the Ryukus campaign. The 700 prisoners of war provided very little information during the interrogations in mid to late August;
reports from the XXIV Intelligence Section state that the men had been impressed into service several years ago and had not been to Korea since. Additionally, as the XXIV Corps Operation Section focused on the amphibious landing in Seoul, none of the Koreans had been to the anticipated landing sites, nor could they provide the needed intelligence on the intentions of the surrendering Japanese. 31 The corps G-2 reports from the time do not state if interrogators explored civil considerations of the Korean population with these POWs. Ironically, the best human intelligence that the G-2 received seemed to come from the Japanese themselves and shaped Hodge's understanding of the situation. XXIV Corps finally made contact with the Japanese on 31 August 1945. They had attempted to reach Seoul by radio for over two days, but a typhoon earlier in the week (which was also responsible for a delay to the amphibious landing support units. The total number of men scheduled for the occupation would total 135,000. 40 The fear that there would be a rapid collapse of Japanese control and a Soviet force that was postured to fill the resultant vacuum was a major planning factor for the U.S. War Department and the Allied Powers in the Pacific. 41 Time was of the essence and there was constant tension between the ability to move troops and conduct an amphibious landing and earliest date that it could be accomplished. Bad weather only further served to increase this tension during the lead up to the actual occupation. According to BLACKLIST, transportation support would come from elements already designated in a supporting role for OLYMPIC to the "maximum extent possible."
42
There was no plan for any movement of troops to the Korean peninsula that they could maximize.
The job of moving the corps was assigned to the 7th Fleet Amphibious Force, of which the commander informed Hodge that he did not have enough assets to move both of his divisions onto the peninsula by the projected landing date of 27 August 1945. 43 While little consolation for the corps staff, the lack of available shipping was not only confined to the Korean occupation forces. BLACKLIST was plagued with transport difficulties and necessitated the movement of the start of the operation in both Korea and Japan later by one week.
44
Hodge and his staff faced a daunting task when SCAP redirected them from an invasion of Japan to the occupation of Korea. They were further challenged when they were ordered to take full operational control of the Korean occupation a mere thirty days from the scheduled entry Chinese mainland for purely political reason; the XXIV Corps replaced them due to geographical considerations. These last minute changes presented three critical obstacles that the staff had to overcome against a backdrop of limited time. The staff had to gain an understanding of the problem facing them on the peninsula, the logistical requirements of moving men and material from within the region to the country of Korea and finally reorganizing a combat unit for the nebulous task of occupation duty. Critical to this planning process and resultant reorganization was the leveraging of military governance assets from throughout U.S. forces in the Pacific.
Hodge and his staff would soon be employing their re-organized corps into a complex environment that they had little time to fully understand.
EMPLOYMENT OF CIVIL AFFAIRS ASSETS
The XXIV Corp's rapid deployment of civil affairs troops (or combat troops tasking with military governance tasks) was critical to the success of the occupation. Having conducted the reorganization of his unit from war fighting to occupation, Hodge now faced the challenge of employing his limited assets effectively. 45 The first aspect of effective employment was the speed in which he could get his combat and military governance troops onto the peninsula and into the outlying provinces. The lack of shipping assets delayed the movement of his troops onto the peninsula. Once on the ground, Hodge's men struggled to occupy the peninsula during the first critical weeks of the operation. Another problem Hodge faced was his reliance on tactical troops for military governance during the initial phases of BLACKLIST. These men were not trained, prepared or equipped for such a mission and were in dire need of military governance support, which would not be available for up to six weeks following the landing at Seoul. Finally, Hodge was conducting governance under the constraints of his higher headquarters. As the Supreme
Commander of Allied Forces in the Pacific, MacArthur had a very clear vision in his mind for how the occupation of Japan would proceed. Despite the cultural differences and the nature of the Korean situation, the XXIV Corps applied the same occupation policies to their operation.
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The one thing Hodge and his staff needed more of, was time. Unfortunately, of all the resources available to a commander, the unrelenting march of time is in many instances the most desired and the scarcest. The lack of time would exacerbate the political and social difficulties that Hodge faced in South Korea. As discussed above, the Koreans desperately wanted their independence and the removal of the Japanese from the peninsula and from governmental positions. Any failure by the XXIV Corps to provide a "stop-gap" for the transition from Japanese colonial rule to Korean self-rule could be catastrophic. From a security stand point, the threat against Japanese personnel and equipment was high. The Korean people were wholly dependent on a Japanese controlled and centralized food distribution at the provincial level. The issue of food distribution would also become a major issue if the XXIV Corps did not establish themselves early and decisively throughout the country. 47 Mr. Merrill Benninghoff, the assigned State Department advisor to Hodge, also understood the necessity for a rapid occupation in order to stabilize the country and ensure successful transition to self-rule. 48 The movement of his forces east from Seoul into the rest of the provinces had to be rapid. In a letter to MacArthur's staff on 13 September 1945, Hodge expressed his concern over the speed of occupation and necessity of tactical troops to conduct military governance tasks. 49 Later in September, when the 96th
Division was re-tasked from the occupation mission after their arrival had been further delayed, Hodge again expressed his frustration with and the need for additional troops during the most 46 The Koreans were not a conquered people as the Japanese were and saw themselves not as occupied, but as the rightful governors of their state.
47 Korea, 1945 existent. The task of "maintain(ing) order" included the restoration of these critical services and doing so fell under the umbrella of tactical military governance out of necessity.
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In accordance with civil affairs doctrine at the time, combat personnel and military governance personnel responsibilities were to be kept distinctly separate in order to prevent untrained combat units from interacting with non combatants and retaining combat power for future operations. While tactical units may be used as "organs" of military government if the possibilities of the resumption of hostilities are remote, they are to be limited in scope to greatest extent possible. 55 The reality during the occupation in Korea (and Japan for that matter) did not provide for such luxuries. His men faced three types of problems throughout the country during the initial occupation of Korea: political, economic and security. 56 The first two issues required pure military governance teams, while the third issue of security would benefit from a combination of tactical employment of combat troops and military governance solutions. In the absence of military governance support and with only an annex from the Field Order 55 to guide them, the men of the tactical divisions were at a distinct disadvantage. 57 As discussed above, compounding these issues was the speed in which the Korean people expected independence.
The confusing chain of command between both the civil affairs and operational units was another effect of using tactical troops in military governance. At the national level, there was a distinct separation between occupation duties by tactical troops and governance duties by civil Once the hand over from tactical to military governance was complete, the combat troops were able to support the civil governance with the desperately needed manpower for security duties and other tasks.
The integration of military governance and operational commanders did not always detract from mission accomplishment. At times, it allowed innovative combat commanders to develop operational approaches to problem sets within their provinces. These solutions to civil issues could then be socialized throughout the corps and passed to adjacent units and possibly south of the 38th parallel to completely remove any vestige of Japanese rule. In fact, the tactic was so effective, that it was adopted nationwide by the USAMGIK later in the year.
63 While using tactical troops for military governance duties was not ideal, Hodge saw that the situation in Korea required such employment. Taken together, the usage of tactical troops was the only way to accomplish the specified tasks in BLACKLIST. Like many military operations at the time, the Soldiers were able to adapt to the unfamiliar situation and through ingenuity and initiative, make the operation successful.
Hindering his ability to tailor his approach to the Korea situation was the insistence by General MacArthur that Korea be treated in a similar manner as that of the Japanese occupation, the status of Korea as that of a quasi belligerent nation and the lack of training military governance personnel on the specifics of Korea. 64 This Korean/Japanese model for occupation from the SCAP staff and MacArthur was most problematic when it came to troop allocation for occupation duty. When Hodge asked for additional troops in September 1945, he received resistance from higher headquarters due to troop calculations for occupation duty. AFPAC had difficulty understanding that if a certain size force in Japan could ensure proper military governance, then an equal or lesser force would certainly be adequate in the non-belligerent country of Korea. Ironically, the size of the force should have been larger in Korea as there was not an existing governmental structure to assist the Allies as there was in Japan. The existing Japanese government allowed for an indirect occupational approach with fewer U.S. troops.
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Hodge knew, from his limited experience in the country, there were fundamental differences 63 Meade, American Military Government in Korea, 60. 64 Ibid., 59.
65 MAJ Lawrence E. Skelly III, "Enemies into Allies: American Stability Operations and Transformation of Japan 1945 -1952 " (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2012 between the two people and that the troop ratio used in Japan would not work in Korea. 66 Adding to the tension between the headquarters, was the need to demobilize and send combat troops home to the United States as quickly as possible. Foremost in his mind was the strained relationship between the Korean civilians and the remaining Japanese troops and civilian administrators. He also saw the Russian presence in the northern portion of the country as another major factor in authorizing more troops in the country. The deterrent effect of having three full combat divisions would do well to keep the Soviets north of the 38th parallel and keep them from interfering in governance affairs within USAFIK's area of responsibility.
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The level of control over the population was another difference between the Japanese and Korean governmental systems. The Japanese vested all control within the Emperor with provincial and local governments executing edicts and directives. The Koreans, on the other hand, while being subject to a similar system during Japanese occupation were intrinsically attracted to a more decentralized governmental organization. The failure of Hodge and his men to recognize this distinction led to long-term issues between the United States and Korea. The transition to nationalization and centralization in Seoul during the early phases of the occupation severely curtailed the ability of provincial governors to serve the constituency that elected them. 68 The governor merely existed in order to serve the national government in Seoul and was unable to enact legislation from the provincial level in order to deal with geographically specific issues.
The structure of the USAGMIK only exacerbated this problem. Ironically, the Koreans were postured to establish a governmental system similar to that of a United States representative and missed opportunity to establish an effective form of government focused on the provinces.
This provincially focused approach was how the Koreans envisioned establishment of governmental control and was the most compatible for the culture and geography of the country.
Unfortunately, American planners did not see it this way and the trust and friendship of the Korean people was the price that they paid. To successfully conduct his occupation, Hodge needed to convince his superiors that Korea was not Japan. The point of Clausewitz's analogy is to illustrate how all three variables are dependent upon each other and create different forms of warfare that the military commander, who is not only responsible for creating, but also must therefore operate within -Hodge was that military commander. His approach to the "Korean problem" had to operate within the framework created by the three legs of Clausewitz's trinity. As they do with all commanders, the limited options he could take as a military force caused tension between the political strategic objectives of the United States, the ways available to him as the senior military commander in Korea and the means made available to conduct the mission. The strategic political friction points that the XXIV Corps had to deal with were the questions of a Soviet Trusteeship and the policies preventing him from establishing a new governing party for a free Korea.
Upon arrival into Korea, American troops found several de facto governments prepared for the eventuality of a free and independent state. If successful independence was the singular end to the occupation of Korea, the XXIV Corps already had a semi-functioning Korea government that could receive the US troops and assist them with the surrender and repatriation of Japanese troops and civilians. This, in fact was the experience when the Soviet XXVth Army when they occupied Korea north of the 38th parallel; they were greeted by a North Korean version of a de facto government and were in a supportive role of the civilian government. The decision by political leadership, nearly 6,000 miles away, to disregard political parties and de facto governmental organizations further constrained Hodge and his approach to occupying the peninsula and made many of his tactical successes within the provinces less effective as he could not capitalize on them to make for more strategic progress.
In comparison to the XXIV Corps, the Soviet XXVth Army operated with little concern for political and strategic tensions in Moscow or elsewhere. They only had one template to use for occupation and that was sovietization of Northern Korea and dealing with the unification of the peninsula at a future date (1950 as it turns out). " 12 December 1945 , Records of General Headquarters, Far East Command, Supreme Commander Allied Powers, and United Nations Command, General Correspondence 1943 -46, RG 554, (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 1945 , Box 1. 78 Ibid. 79 Spector, 146. 80 Ibid., [147] [148] regime, but an approach of selecting a political leader for a newly liberated country to serve as the embodiment for unification and control, would have assisted Hodge with his tasks. While MacArthur gave Hodge seemingly limitless power to conduct his governance mission in Korea, the one thing that he was missing was establishing the "foundation for a Korean national government" and appointing a leader of such a national government early in the occupation would have been effective. 81 did not see the distinct differences between the two countries.
Finally, Hodge had to deal with the conflicting strategic guidance from the U.S. political leadership and the SCAP. The Allies declared outright or inferred that Korea would be a free and independent nation multiple times before the surrender of Japan. The Korean people and the military commanders responsible for the occupation and governance of the peninsula received their message. It shaped the way in which both the Koreans and the U.S. military leadership envisioned the execution of BLACKLIST. Unfortunately, the political realities led to multiple changes in the approach to BLAKLIST, causing operational setbacks and frustration amongst the population. The larger geopolitical situation was exacerbated by a lack of an understanding of the political, social and economic situation on the peninsula. Hodge found himself unable to choose an approach that would lead to a rapid independence for Korea, as it would not align with political objectives of a complicated alliance between the U.S. and Soviets. Despite stated policy, the U.S. did not support true self-determination for Korea. It adopted the Japanese model in a country that had not been a belligerent of the Allies.
Operational and strategic leaders can learn much from the experiences of the XXIV Corps and their mission of occupying Korea following World War II. By studying the planning process and the employment of civil military assets during BLACKLIST, one can begin to understand the magnitude of the tasks that await them. Employing a force organized to conduct combat operations in a nation building capacity remains as difficult today as it did over 60 years ago. As it was back then, the answer of handing over governance to a "civil affairs" element does not reflect the reality of the situation. Conventional US forces will continue to conduct governance to some degree while deployed in a combat role. The US Army is expected to "fight and win the nation's wars" with the implied task being winning the peace as well. The current state of civil affairs personnel today is inadequate for the missions that the conventional forces are asked to do at the conclusion of combat operations. The shortfall was just as evident during the post-conflict operations in Iraq as it was during the military governance operations in the Pacific in 1945. A smaller active duty civil affairs force means that specialization is not efficient or even possible. Special skills such as language expertise and cultural knowledge are lacking in the today's active duty civil affairs force. 94 The lack of regional experts within the civil affairs formations today lead to the same issues that Hodge faced as he could not employ Korean experts during the critical few months of the occupation. An increase in civil affairs personnel in the active duty force would free combat commanders from focusing on post conflict tasks during the execution of high intensity conflict.
As the experience of the US Army in World War II has shown, awaiting a military force at the end of a major conflict is a period of stability operations and some degree of military governance. 95 In the case of the XXIV Corps, operational level planning for such a mission is not to be left for two weeks prior to the execution. Further, assuming that military governance troops will bear the brunt of military governance tasks is a fallacy and will lead to ad hoc organizations that are not trained or equipped to handle such politically delicate and critical tasks. Adding to the criticality of a well-executed military governance mission following major combat operations is the inevitable power vacuum that exists after the defeat of an adversarial regime. Generally, the U.S. military conducts combat operations against countries that have installed autocratic totalitarian regimes in order to control their people. These regimes exercise this control by centralizing power and controlling the distribution of necessary goods and services to the populace. A legitimate authority must conduct these tasks as soon as possible in order to ensure stability and set the conditions for the establishment of a governmental system that is conducive to the interests of the United States. By employing a government force, combat commanders would not focus on post conflict operations while they are engaged in combat with the enemy.
Allowing a stability force with the requisite experience and expertise to analyze the predicted post conflict situation would lead to better employment of a scarce resource. Taken together, having two smaller forces conduct specified tasks will take less national resources than having one larger force conduct the entire range of combat operations.
The mission of the United States Army remains as it has always been, "To fight and win our nation's wars." The meaning of that mission has changed drastically over the last century and will continue to do so. "Winning a war" no longer focuses on the defeat of the enemy, but the establishment of a functioning society to replace the belligerent that was defeated in combat. In fact, in times of limited war, one could argue that "winning the peace" is just as important as defeating your enemy. The transition after combat is one rife with danger and complexities. Using our combat forces to transition from destroying the enemy to maintaining peace and setting the conditions for democracy, while possible, remains as difficult today as it was in Korea in the post World War II period.
